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Wojciech Kalaga
Tertium non datur? Wildness and Methodology
The choice of the paper for this volume has been largely limited by editorial 
requirements: the language of publication (English) and the original publisher (Uni‑
versity of Silesia Press). In fact, this particular article would have been pretty far down 
the line of papers I would wish to have republished on this occasion — not because 
I consider it unworthy, but because there are other papers, both those already anthol‑
ogized and more recent, which in a more direct way formulate my theoretical stance 
and, in my opinion, are more clearly identifiable contributions to literary studies.
There are, however, reasons which justify the inclusion of “Tertium non datur?…” 
in the anniversary volume. The paper not only reflects my constant interest in meth‑
odological issues, but also — rather unusually on my part — combines methodologi‑
cal and theoretical considerations with actual analyses of literary texts (W.B. Yeats, 
Wisława Szymborska); it actually contains — which may be of some anecdotal inter‑
est — my own translation of a poem by Szymborska from the time before her Nobel 
Prize, when she was not yet a celebrity. The methodological stance of the argument 
is best epitomized in its closing sentence: “It is this wild terrain of the spectrum, which 
contests the tertium non datur principle, that I want to postulate as the area of our 
exploration.” From the theoretical perspective, this contestation of the tertium non 
datur foreshadows the concept of the Third, which I developed later, and which for 
some time became a subject of inquiry in the Institute, and also evoked more gen‑
eral interest in other centres in Poland (especially — and with mutual inspiration 
— among young scholars in the cultural studies department at Adam Mickiewicz 
University in Poznań). Still within the realm of theory, the paper in a prelim  inary 
way focuses — via literary analysis — on the difference within (rather than differ‑
ence between), which again became one of the leading motifs in my proposal for 
nomadic genre studies. Albeit brief, the article thus modestly prefigures some areas 
of my subsequent research. On a different note, what I personally like about it, is the 
uncovering of the paradoxical nature of the concept of the wild as the most tamed 
of all concepts, and, paradoxically again, as resisting the regime of duality through 
its own inherent self ‑contradictoriness.
Of the two themes of this paper, i.e. wildness and methodology, the latter will 
come first. This does not mean that it will attempt either to tame or to dominate, or 
to eclipse wildness. I will start by highlighting a methodological issue and then will 
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seek support from the wild via certain analogies. The methodological question that 
will be brought up surfaced at a departmental meeting with a paper on the mar‑
vellous, the feminine, and magic realism by Mary Macullan from the University of 
North London. During our discussion regarding the problem of the manifestation 
of the the marvellous the discussants divided themselves into two opposing groups 
whose stances could be epitomized as the emphasis on  difference, on the one hand, 
and the emphasis on similarity on the other hand.
According to the first group, the similar instances of the marvelllous in differ‑
ent cultures are radically and irrevocably different in the sense of manifesting an 
incompatibility of the categories of those cultures. Beowulf, for example, cannot be 
a manifestation of the same marvellous which is embodied in the tales of the South 
American magical realism. We could say that this stance acts on the principle that 
no instances of similarity can overpower the differences that accompany them, to 
the extent that could allow generalizing claims of sameness. The other stance acts on 
a radically opposite principle, namely that the various instances of difference can‑
not thwart the fundamental similarity as the basis of systematizing generalizations. 
On this view, the various manifestations of the marvellous, despite the differences, 
are similar in the sense of manifesting some common pattern (what we called, by an 
operational metaphor, an archetypal similarity). Following this stance, the marvellous 
in Beowulf, or say in Ursula Leguin, and in magical realism of South American prose, 
share something in common, however ineffable or sublime that something might be.
It is quite obvious that the first stance — the one emphasizing difference —  does 
not renounce similarity as a critical principle. On the contrary, we see the exponents 
of this stance move between the most distant textual lands for the sake of engineer‑
ing a bricolage of analogies and similarities. There is one condition, however, which 
must be observed. These similarities have to be contingent and not necessary, i.e. 
they must be incidental, annuling a hypothetical underlying system to prove that 
globalizing systems do not exist. In other words, they must not be generic simi‑
larities which confirm the existence of a totalizing systemic force. Just like the first 
stance does not renounce similarity, so the second stance — the one emphasizing 
similarity — does not renounce difference, but uses it as the principle of semantic 
discrimination within its grids, typologies, and genealogies. Unlike in the case of 
the first stance, however, these differences must be ruled by necessity and not by 
contingency, i.e. in the Saussurean manner they must represent the system itself.
Now, there are two kinds of error which both these stances may commit. First, 
that error could be primarily ethical, i.e. it could consist in the totalitarian impo‑
sition of the globalizing necessity by those who believe in the System, and of the 
hypocritical pretence of those who denounce all truth (or the possibility of truth), 
the System including, and at the same time claim that their opponents are wrong. 
Secondly, the error could consist in the denial or neglect to acknowledge that both 
positions find their ultimate semblance in the Kantian predicament, i.e. that in 
both cases the structures of mind, of perception, of cognition and recognition (or 
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whatever more or less technical or poetic way one chooses to call them) determine 
the constitution of the constructed object. The result of these errors is a polariza‑
tion of stances leading to their incompability and incommesurability. If those errors 
are avoided, however, the impending polarization will give way to a contestation 
the logic of duality.
Let us briefly reiterate. Of the two methodological positions I described at the 
beginning, the first relies on necessity while the second on contingency. Yet, unless 
the exponents of the two stances stand by the errors mentioned above, no radi‑
cal contradiction between them is established. For the opposition between them 
is not the opposition between extremities of the same qualities or values, like that 
between the necessity of difference and contingency of difference, or between the 
necessity of similarity and contingency of similarity. On the contrary, while their 
strong principles, which are the necessity of difference (systematicity) on the one 
hand, and contingency of similarity (fragmentation, incidentality) on the other 
hand, remain as central methodological determinants of two extreme poles, there 
remains a whole spectrum of floating relations of difference and similarity between 
those two poles. It happens so because the assumption of the former stance (i.e. the 
necessity of difference) does not in fact exclude the contingency of similarity, even 
though it relegates it from the centre of its attention; and vice versa, the assumption 
of the second stance (the contingency of similarity) does not exclude the necessity 
of difference, but likewise relegates it to the margins of its vision. And it is exactly 
this slight deviation, a slight curve, an oscillation within the opposition of the two 
stances — consisting in a clash of necessity and contingency, but a clash relating to 
two different values — that contests the tertium non datur principle and circum‑
scribes an area of common inquiry.
Two interim observations suggest themselves at this stage. First, on a microscale, 
one notices that — despite appearances — the relation between the two stances is 
not based on mutual exclusion or incommensurability. While they remain in oppo‑
sition on many levels of reference, they also share an area of potential consensus. 
Rather than as a polarized dichotomy or a binary opposition we should look at those 
stances as determinants of a methodological spectrum. Secondly, on a macroscale, if 
one were to risk a generalization, the floating relation between the two axes of the 
opposition (necessity ‑contingency; difference ‑similarity) accounts for the continu‑
ity, or what Barthes calls glissement, between structuralism and post ‑structuralism 
(the former, roughly speaking, relying on the necessity of difference, while the latter 
on the contingency of similarity), and explains why these two discursive formations 
cannot, in fact, be seen as separated by a radical breech.
What has been said so far seems pretty civilised, and it is only here that wildness 
comes in by way of a certain analogy. This analogy is neither directly conceptual 
nor directly structural, but is based on the ability of the wild to resist the regime 
of the tertium non datur principle, which, as we have seen, was also overcome by 
the floating relation of contingency and necessity in our methodological question.
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The word “wild” is internally rifted and fissured from within in a  way 
which suggests its particular usefulness for subverting the logic of duality. First, 
and paradoxically, the word Wild is more civilised than any other word: it not 
only tames reality, as does any other word, but also immediately, in one gesture, 
tames that which it proclaims untamed (the wild). To name a fragment of reality 
(to call it wild, for example) is first to isolate and identify it and than to subdue 
it to our linguistic will, to tame it, or as some of us would say, to colonize it. We 
might pastiche Heidegger’s “naming is calling”1 into “naming is taming.” The 
wild existed truly only at the state of untained, undifferentiated wildness before 
the existence of the word, i.e. before the possibility of the Other. But then, it did 
not know it was so wild; in fact, it did not know it was wild at all. Only naming 
made it knowingly wild, but unknowingly tamed. Naming is calling, naming is 
taming. Wild is thus also richer even than those words, which posit their opposi‑
tions only for the sake of their own becoming, but then annihilate those opposi‑
tions as invalid (for example, in the poststructuralist discourse metaphorical posits
literal in order to establish its own distinctiveness only to encroach on the semantic 
terrain of this posited opposition and  to monopolize that terrain without excep‑
tion, thus leaving literal empty). In the case of Wild the conflict occurs within the
word, and wildness, albeit retained, is also re ‑tained. Wildness as a concept con‑
tains in itself its own contradiction and thus of itself contradicts the laws of binary 
logic.
Despite the doubts, or perhaps because of the doubts regarding its clear ‑cut 
nature, one feels the need to find a pivotal point which might become a point of 
reference for the distinction between the cultured/human and wild as the other. 
That point of reference could be memory, or teleology, or regularity, or in fact any 
of the connotative values that enter into semantic play within the opposition; none 
of those mentioned, however, seems to be able to perform that pivotal role. A fac‑
tor capable of a radical and definitive insight must come from the utmost moment 
of existence, and that factor — which also touches other related concepts such as 
language, interpretation, or being — is the invention of death as a cultural caesura 
between two eschatologically separate domains.
A very strog impulse to posit the awareness of death as the pivotal indication 
of what is appropriately human as opposed to the other (or, metaphorically speak‑
ing, to the wild), comes, of course, from Heidegger. His concepts of Sein ‑zum ‑Tode 
(Being ‑towards ‑Death) and of the profound awe (Angst) the awareness of death 
evokes, determine the authenticity of human existence and differentiate it from 
OTHER ways of being. But there is an even stronger and more radical impulse 
which, given its essential dyadicity, comes from an unexpected direction, namely 
from the poetry of W.B. Yeats:
1 Martin Heidegger, “Language,” in: Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. 
A. Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 2001).
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Death
Nor dread nor hope attend a dying animal;
A man awaits his end
Dreading and hoping all;
Many times he died, 
Many times rose again.
A great man in his pride
Confronting murderous men
Casts derision upon
Supersession of breath;
Man knows death to the bone —
Man has created death.
This is primarily a  political poem inspired by the assassination of Kevin 
O’Higgins, Vice ‑President of the Irish Free State. Let us, however, disregard its 
political and historical reference and concentrate only on the general judgements 
that Yeats makes, i.e. on the first couplet and the last line of the poem: “Nor dread 
nor hope attend a dying animal […].  Man has created death.”
Here, it is not even the awareness (as in Heidegger), but the invention, the 
creation of death that distinguishes man from beast. By positing death as a human 
invention Yeats reinstates the perennial western dichotomy and introduces a radi‑
cal opposition between the civilized (cultured, linguistic, semiotic) and the non‑
 ‑civilized, i.e. the wild, which does not differentiate between phases of the organic 
processes occuring in the world, supersession of breath including.
This anthropocentric and dichotomous attitude is confirmed in at least two 
other poems by Yeats (“The Tower” and “Vaccillation”) and and also in “The Death 
of a Hare” where death and wildness actually come together:
The Death of a Hare
I have pointed out the yelling pack,
The hare leap to the wood,
And when I pass a compliment
Rejoice as lover should
At the drooping of an eye,
At the mantling of the blood.
Then suddenly my heart is wrung
By her distracted air
And I remember wildness lost
And after, swept from there,
Am set down standing in the wood
At the death of the hare.
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Here, the death of a  hare is wildness lost. But the equation of death with 
the loss of wildness can occur only from the perspective of man: of the one who 
invented death as the ultimate moment of life. For man, the invention of death 
as finality entails the concept of necessity, while for the animal — if we impose 
our anthropomorphic categories again — dying is in a sense a matter of contin‑ 
gency which does not eliminate one from nature, even though it does involve 
a supercession of breath; organic processes continue to take place embracing the 
dying ‑dead organism, albeit differently. By pointing to the eschatological differ‑
ence between man and beast, i.e. between the order of civilization and the order 
of the wild, Yeats draws the polar opposition between the necessary and the con‑
tingent.
Let us now take a brief look at another poem about man, death, and beast, which, 
however, overpowers the polar duality established by Yeats’ “Death.”
Kot w pustym mieszkaniu
Umrzeć — tego nie robi się kotu.
Bo co ma począć kot
w pustym mieszkaniu.
Wdrapywać się na ściany.
Ocierać między meblami.
Nic tu niby nie zmienione,
a jednak pozamieniane.
Nic nie przesunięte,
a jednak porozsuwane.
I wieczorami lampa już nie świeci.
Słychać kroki na schodach,
ale to nie te.
Ręka, co kładzie rybę na talerzyk,
także nie ta co kładła.
Coś się tu nie zaczyna
 o swojej zwykłej porze.
Coś się tu nie odbywa
jak powinno.
Ktoś tutaj był i był,
a potem nagle zniknął
i uporczywie go nie ma.
Do wszystkich szaf się zajrzało.
Przez półki przebiegło.
Wcisnęło się pod dywan i sprawdziło.
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Nawet złamało zakaz
i rozrzuciło papiery.
Co więcej jest do zrobienia.
Spać i czekać.
Niech ‑no on tylko wróci,
niech ‑no się pokaże.
Już on się dowie,
że tak z kotem nie można.
Będzie się szło w jego stronę
jakby się wcale nie chciało,
pomalutku,
na bardzo obrażonych łapach.
I żadnych skoków pisków na początek.
[A Cat in an Empty Flat
To die — you don’t do that to a cat.
For what should a cat do
In an empty flat.
Climb the walls.
Rub its back against furniture.
Nothing has changed — it seems,
but it has.
Nothing has been moved — it seems,
but it has been.
And the lamp is out at night.
One hears footsteps on the stairs,
but not the footsteps.
Nor is the hand that puts the fish on the plate
the one that used to be.
Something here does not begin
at the usual time.
Something does not happen
as it should.
Someone was here, and was,
and then suddenly was no more
and persistently is not here.
One has looked into the wardrobes.
One has run through all the shelves.
One has squeezed oneself under the carpet to check.
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One has even done the forbidden
and scattered the papers.
What else can one do.
Sleep and wait.
But let him just come,
let him just show himself here.
He will soon find out
such things are not done to the cat.
One will walk towards him
as if one did not want to at all,
very slowly,
feet sulking.
And no jumping miaowing at the start.]
The strategy of the poem relies on an internally incogruent persona. Even 
though the monologue is in the third person, and in spite of its anthropomorphic 
tinge, the speaker in the poem is the cat describing its own experience of absence. 
The first line — despite an apparently impersonal tenor — is integrated into the 
monologue’s unity and reflects the cat’s awareness of death (“To die — you don’t 
do that to a cat”). As we proceed, however, that awareness of death is put into 
question, particularly in the third stanza and especially through its final stylization 
of naiveté (“Someone was here, and was, and then suddenly was no more”). Even‑
tually, the last lines reflect the cat’s innocence of the knowledge of death (“But let 
him just come … etc.”). What occurs in the poem is an anthropomorphization of 
the cat through the projection of a human perspective (after all, as Yeats suggests, 
it is man who has created death) — a kind of a taming of the cat (wild) — and at 
the same time a rejection of that perspective. In effect, the dichotomy man ‑cat, or 
more generally: civilised ‑other, is broken and fuzziness retrospectively dominates 
the poem. The epitome of this fuzziness, and a foretoken of the contestation of 
binarity, are the four pre ‑final lines of the first stanza (“Nothing has changed — 
it seems, but it has”).
If Yeats’s poem foregrounds death as the radical mark of humanity, Szymbor‑
ska’s poem — while subtly confirming the anthropomorphicity of death — at the 
same time circumscribes a terrain common and undistinguishable to man and the 
other (the cat, the wild). Yeats establishes death as a binary logic of the difference 
BETWEEN; Szymborska establishes death as a cojoining difference, a difference 
which not only demands, but also entails similarity, or in other words a differ‑
ence WITHIN. When referred to the theoretical question posed at the beginning 
of this paper, Yeats illustrates the methodology of polarity: looking through his 
glasses at the two stances described earlier one would be determined to discern 
only oppositions. Szymborska, on the other hand, is a methodologist of the spec‑
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trum: while only subtly signalling the binarity of the poles, she most of all explores 
the illogical terrain between them. It is this wild terrain of the spectrum, which 
contests the tertium non datur principle, that I want to postulate as the area of 
our exploration.
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